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In an article last year for Foco, Economia e Negocios, I suggested that Brazil might be 
getting very close to missing its best opportunity ever to “turn the corner,” which I 
defined as the capability to issue treasury bonds in Reais at fixed interest rates of no more 
than 10% per annum for tenures of at least 10 years. I argued this through comparison 
with four other relatively favorable moments— in terms of political and economic 
tranquility—of the last 100 years, namely: 
 
(i) The late 1920’s: a period marked by robust economic growth with consistent trade 
surpluses (while dependent on coffee exports) and consolidation of a democratic political 
regime, just prior to the Great Depression and, for Brazil, a balance of payments crisis 
only to be overcome towards the end of World War II; 
 
(ii) The late 1970’s: a time of even stronger economic growth with trade surpluses (while 
too exposed to oil imports) and with inflation (“stabilized” via indexation) at 40% per 
year, just prior to the Iran crisis which triggered a sharp escalation of oil prices and 
interest rates globally and, for Brazil, another balance of payments crisis only to be 
overcome in the early 1990’s with the Brady Plan; 
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(ii) 1996-1997: almost two years of solid economic growth with low inflation (under 
6%/annum), with the effects of the Mexican crisis, which erupted soon after the 
introduction of the Real in July 1994, overcome. However, the country still carried 
significant foreign indebtedness and incurred trade and fiscal deficits. This was just prior 
to the Asian (mid-1997) and Russian (late 1998) crises and, another balance of payments 
crisis for Brazil, which this time was more readily supplanted by the combination of a 
maxi-devaluation (January 1999) and adherence to a macroeconomic regime (still in 
effect) combining a floating exchange rate, a target inflation rate and a target primary 
fiscal surplus; 
 
(iv) The first semester of 2002: a period of solid trade surplus (around 2% of GDP), 
inflation under control (at 8% per annum), a base (SELIC) interest rate at 16% (and 
expected to decline), and a relatively stable exchange rate (at R$ 2.2 per U.S. dollar).  
Global financial markets, however, had one eye on the deterioration of the situation in 
Argentina (evolving from a sovereign default to an increasingly likely debt repudiation) 
and the other on the delicate political transition to occur in Brazil. Growing concerns 
about the possibility of a significant departure by a new government from the 
macroeconomic policy in place caused a major confidence crisis and, beginning in June, 
a substantial reversal of capital flows. This time even short term trade finance lines were 
cut by international banks. Within five months the Real had suffered an 80%  devaluation 
(from R$ 2.2/US$ in May to R$ 3.9/US$ in October), the base interest rate had to be 
hiked back up to 25%, and growth prospects, at least temporarily, compromised. 
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By mid-2007 the world was experiencing its sixth year of solid economic growth, in good 
measure due to strong and continued demand for consumption in the U.S. and increased 
supply of consumer goods at relatively stable prices by developing economies (led by 
China and India). For Brazil, this meant significantly better prices for export commodities 
and consistently higher trade surpluses month after month, allowing for a solid path 
towards the zeroing of the country’s net foreign indebtedness.  It also implied that 2007 
could turn out to be the second year of GDP growth in excess of 4% for the country in 
this millennium and led to projections, by Wall Street and Brazilian banks, of sustained 
and robust economic growth with continued gradual reduction of interest rates in Reais. 
But net public sector indebtedness remained too high (over 40% of GDP) for its carrying 
cost (8% in real terms) and aggregate investment remained too low (20% of GDP).  
 
My fear for the medium term was that Brazil’s slow march towards “turning the corner” 
could be interrupted by a global economic slowdown to be caused by higher interest rates 
in the U.S. (inflationary pressures were then already evident) and reduction of the rhythm 
and increased costs of production in China (due to lower global demand plus increasing 
environmental pressures). But the crisis— the so-called subprime meltdown— came 
sooner, as a result of the rupture of the U.S. real estate price bubble which had been 
fostered for so long by a lax U.S. monetary policy, particularly between December 2001 
and November 2004, during which period the Fed funds rate was maintained below 2% 
per annum, actually 1% between July 2003 and July 2004. 
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Very low interest rates in a society so much in love with leverage led to explosive growth 
in the demand for credit (against “perceived” wealth) by individuals and in the supply of 
credit (based on over optimistic risk modeling) by banks. Real estate prices, which had 
gone up on average some 3% per annum between 1990 and 2000, went up on average 
around 9% per annum between 2000 and 2006 (over 10% per annum after 2004). 
Subprime lending, defined as 100% mortgage financings at subsidized adjustable rates in 
the early years (to be reset later), became increasingly popular. Capital markets creativity, 
lax regulatory supervision, less than adequate credit ratings and generalized greed 
conspired to bring about additional levels of poorly priced financial instruments.  
 
At its roots, the subprime meltdown crisis was not very different from other financial 
crises we have seen around the world. Rather, it can be seen as history repeating itself:  
the perception of sustained economic stability and growth leading to excessive optimism 
by lenders and borrowers, an economic slowdown, severe balance sheet problems for 
banks, the risk of a major recession, and a government sponsored bailout of the financial 
sector. What made this crisis unique— and particularly dangerous—is that it was 
nurtured over a long period of time in the country with the largest economy, the most 
creative financial market and the world’s most credible and widely accepted currency. 
 
Competent people in government and in the private sector now acknowledge that risks 
incurred were much higher than risks measured. Lessons apparently have been learned 
and, in due time, a revised global regulatory framework should emerge to impose greater  
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transparency by stricter supervision of, and higher capital requirements for, financial 
institutions according to the specific risks they take. But the losses of private sector 
financial institutions have been colossal and the support required from the government, 
provided initially by the Fed (through overall liquidity support and collateralized lending 
to banks and investment banks), has been massive and continuous; and explicitly by the 
U.S. Treasury with the nationalizations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (US$ 100 billion 
for each in credit facilities at 10% interest per annum in exchange for 80% equity stakes) 
and AIG (US $ 85 billion,  also at 10% interest, in exchange for 80% equity stake).  
 
Still, much more was yet to come. On October 3 the U.S. Congress passed the Trouble 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) legislation. Under TARP Congress authorized the U.S. 
Treasury to acquire up to US$ 700 billion in primarily but not necessarily mortgage credit 
risk to help clean the balance sheet of private sector banks in an attempt to restore life to 
U.S. credit markets. In order to speed up action while seeking to mitigate final cost to 
taxpayers, the U.S. Treasury was authorized by the TARP legislation to take preferred 
equity positions in the financial institutions receiving assistance.  By October 10, the U.S. 
Treasury’s authorized potential credit exposure to the financial sector bailout stood at 
approximately US$ 1 trillion, some 7% of the country’s GDP. 
 
U.S. low interest rates and recurring large trade and fiscal deficits also stimulated 
feverish economic activity around the world, allowing for extraordinary trade surpluses, 
particularly for oil exporting countries and leading emerging market economies. 
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Credit tightness in the U.S. arising from the subprime meltdown has spilled over 
internationally, initially having greater impact on the economies with greater linkages to 
the U.S. financial markets. Central banks around the globe have been forced to act– in 
many cases, like that of the main European countries, with explicit potential Treasury 
involvement— to provide assistance to their respective financial systems, including the 
possibility of governments taking equity stakes in home banks.  In an attempt to avert the 
triggering of a global recession, a joint .5%  coordinated interest rate cut was put in effect 
in early October by the U.S. and leading European central banks and continued 
cooperation among these central banks to provide liquidity to the market, particularly in 
U.S. dollars, has been agreed upon.                                                                                                                      
 
Which takes us back to Brazil. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Tightening of U.S. dollar funding and reversal of capital flows has caused an immediate 
and significant devaluation of the Real, from R$1.8/US$ in late September to R$2.3/US$ 
by October 10. But at this level the Real is simply back to where it was in early 2002, 
when the global boom was still at its early stages and, as indicated above, the country 
marched comfortably towards a trade surplus of 2% of GDP. And Brazil, presently a net 
creditor in US dollars, is today much more protected against the destabilizing effects of 
capital flight than ever before. 
                                                                          
There have been very significant losses in market value of the leading publicly traded  
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Brazilian banks (on average, approximately 50% in US dollars between January 1 and 
October 10). But the financial system appears to be in good health. Still fresh in the 
minds of Brazilian bankers and regulators are the lessons from the banking crisis of 1995 
(which led to the PROER and PROES rescue plans, at significant cost to taxpayers) and 
the capital flight/foreign exchange crisis of 2002, which severed U.S. dollar funding and 
caused credit and mark-to-market losses to banks but did not require government 
assistance to the financial system, by then much more robust. Capital requirements, 
disclosure and provisioning rules imposed by the Central Bank on the Brazilian banks are 
strict and have been, now for over a decade, very tightly monitored. In addition, most of 
the country’s leading insurance companies and investment banks are controlled by these 
closely supervised banks. It is, therefore, quite unlikely that a failure by a major financial 
institution could result. And because monetary policy has been austere, liquidity 
assistance (particularly to smaller banks, as per the measures announced in October) can 
be provided without severely compromising inflation targets.    
 
Still, a major economic slowdown seems unavoidable.  And, unfortunately, no material 
qualitative progress has been made by Brazil over the past several years on the structural 
front. Final design and agreement on fiscal reform (towards taxation of income and/or 
consumption and not of production), on labor reform (towards reduction of the indirect 
costs of employment and increased incentive to formal employment) and on social 
security reform (towards stronger incentives to voluntary savings by workers while 
preserving acquired rights from past contributions) remain at large. These are conditions  
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precedent for the establishment of an environment where the conjunction of competent 
fiscal and monetary policies could finally transform heroically pursued primary fiscal 
surpluses each year into a reliable perspective of a balanced nominal budget for the 
medium term— the change of gear necessary for the country’s turning of the corner. 
 
Only then, with the capability to issue Treasury bonds at fixed nominal rates of no more 
than 10% in Reais with tenors of at least 10 years, could Brazil finally cease to depend 
exclusively on the compulsory savings of the National Bank of Development System 
(BNDES) for the medium term financing in domestic currency of the investment in 
infrastructure (such as the R$ 15 billion approved in May for hydroelectric power plants 
in the Rio Madeira), ownership restructurings (such as the R$ 2.5 billion approved last 
August to finance share purchases among controlling shareholders of Oi Telecom, prior 
to this company’s acquisition of Brasil Telecom), plus all the crucial investment in Reais 
by Brazilian companies in serious competition against their rivals in China, India and 
other countries where long term financing in domestic currency at less than 10% per 
annum exists. 
 
Many percentage points of GDP growth have been left on the table as a result of Brazil’s 
incapacity to complete the set of actions necessary to guarantee long term economic 
stability. Several precious additional points of GDP will continue to be forever lost if the 
country accepts the current status quo of “inflation under control” and “acceptable rate of 
growth given the international crises,” instead of seeking maximum economic efficiency 
with social justice. But, as I suggested in the article for Foco, Economia e Negocios over 
a year ago, reaching this dream requires a degree of conviction and political commitment 
that the Brazilian society may perceive as important but does not treat as urgent and, as a 
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